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Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule
By Lyman PQ. Johnson *
"[The business judgment rule], which began as a minor exception, is now so
dominant a winning argument that the only fun left is trying to prove that [it]
... does not cover absolutely all forms of corporate theft."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate officers stand at the very center of recent business scandals.2 Exec-
utive misconduct has led to numerous criminal charges, 3 the bringing of Securities
and Exchange Commission administrative proceedings, 4 and the imposition of
substantial new federal responsibilities mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 5 One
sector of society that, historically, has been strangely silent about officer wrong-
doing, is state corporate law.6 Even here, however, prominent judges in Dela-
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University Law School. The Frances Lewis
Law Center provided support for this project. The author wishes to thank Frank Balotti, Larry Ham-
ermesh, and David Millon for their helpful comments, and David Freed, Kevin White, and Christina
Bowden for their excellent research assistance.
1. David Bazelon, Clients Against LawyeJ RPER'S MAG., Sept. 1967, at 104, 112 (quoted in DAVID
COWAN BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
2 (1986)).
2. See, e.g., Peter Grant & Christine Nuzum, Adelphia Founder and One Son Found Guilty, WALL ST.
J., July 9, 2004, at Al; John R. Emshwiller et al., Lay Strikes Back as Indictment Cites Narrow Role in
Enron Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2004, at Al; Executives on Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct.
3, 2003, at B1 (detailing criminal charges and investigations against various corporate officers).
3. Grant & Nuzum, supra note 2, at Al; Emshwiller et al., supra note 2, at Al; Executives on Trial:
Scandal Scorecard, supra note 2, at BI.
4. Grant & Nuzum, supra note 2, at Al; Emshwiller et al., supra note 2, at Al; Executives on Trial:
Scandal Scorecard, supra note 2, at B1.
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Star. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). For a detailed description of the officer responsibilities
mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, see Lyman PQ. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1149, 1178-92 (2004).
6. A leading treatise on corporate directors and officers summed up the state of the law as follows:
"[Tihere is little law on the subject of the liability of corporate officers who are not directors." WILLIAM
E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.15, at 1-54 (2003).
See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 4.17, at 4-36 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) ("Few authorities deal with the nature of the
obligation owed by officers to the corporation and its stockholders."); see also A. Gilchrist Sparks IllI
& Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 Bus. LAW. 215,
215 (1992) (stating "The precise nature of the duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not
directors is a topic that has received little attention from courts and commentators."). Several states
have adopted reforms inspired by the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Largely, these reforms address
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ware7-the leading corporate law state-have remarked that they expect a new
focus on litigation against officers. In fact, to accommodate the expected lawsuits,
effective January 1, 2004, the Delaware Chancery Court now asserts personal
jurisdiction over officers of Delaware corporations."
Two problems immediately confront the effort to bring fiduciary duty claims
against miscreant officers. First, despite a great deal of loose talk that officers are
"fiduciaries,"9 such assertions typically fail to supply any conceptual or positive
law foundation for that claim. Recently, this author and David Millon have argued
that officers owe strong fiduciary duties because, unlike corporate directors, they
are agents of the corporation. 10 Second, even with a clear theoretical basis for
advancing fiduciary duty claims against officers, when sued, those officers will
likely invoke, in defense, the generous protection of the business judgment rule."
This Article argues that the business judgment rule-a cornerstone concept in
corporate law-does not and should not be extended to corporate officers in the
same broad manner in which it is applied to directors. The argument proceeds
along both descriptive and normative lines. Part II begins by noting the frequency
with which commentators and courts uncritically assert that the business judg-
ment rule does cover officers as a matter of positive law. That Part then canvasses
decisions applying--or purporting to apply-the business judgment rule to of-
ficers. The examination reveals a decidedly more mixed picture than is commonly
believed. Delaware, for example, has very little law at all on corporate officers,
and has yet to hold squarely that the rule applies to officers as well as directors.1
2
Only one decision in any jurisdiction appears to have adopted the rule in con-
nection with an officer of a publicly-held corporation, and the court went on,
moreover, to find the rule inapplicable. 3 Furthermore, although many decisions
state that the rule applies to officers, several of these cases involved officers who
also served as directors. Consequently, it is unclear whether the rule would be
accounting, securities, and disclosure issues, rather than corporate governance subjects. See Timothy
A. French & Larry D. Soderquist, State Responses to Corporate Corruption: Thirteen Mini Sarbanes-Oxley
Acts, 32 SEC. REG. kJ. 168 (2004).
7. See E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom Environment,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 851 (2003); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New
Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1002-03 (2003). Mr. Veasey recently retired as Chief Justice of
the Delaware Supreme Court. Mr. Chandler is Chancellor, and Mr. Strine is a Vice Chancellor, on the
Delaware Chancery Court.
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2002).
9. The foundational case on corporate fiduciary duties in Delaware stated: "Corporate officers and
directors ... stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders." Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). A leading corporate law treatise puts the matter as follows: "[Clorporate
directors and officers occupy a fiduciary capacity... To a great extent, the rules governing liability
are the same whether the officer sued is a director or some other officer such as the president, vice
president, secretary...." WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 837.50, 991 (3d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2004).
10. Lyman PQ Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM.
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
11. See infra Part 11 B.
12. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
13. AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 E Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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extended to an officer qua officer. Often, moreover, judicial assertions concerning
the rule's application to officers are extraneous to the ratio decidendi of the case
and, hence, constitute mere dicta. A close review of decisions also reveals that,
almost without exception, courts fail to state why, on policy grounds, the rule is
(or should be) applied to officers in the same expansive way it is said to apply to
directors. Finally, cases acknowledging concern about a possible "clash" between
the demanding fiduciary strictures imposed on officers by agency law, on the one
hand, and the substantial deference of the business judgment rule as applied to
officers, on the other hand, are quite rare. Overall, this Part concludes that ap-
plication of the business judgment rule to officer conduct is not firmly established
in case law.
Part III lays the groundwork for addressing this topic from a policy standpoint.
This Part sketches the three standard rationales said to underlie application of the
business judgment rule to directors. Part IV builds on this base in framing the
key policy issues facing courts as they confront claims of officer wrongdoing: what
degree of deference (or scrutiny) should courts bring to their review of challenged
officer conduct? Should it be the same as, or different from, the standard applied
to director conduct, and why? The three conventional rationales for applying the
business judgment rule to directors are assessed for their relevance to corporate
officers and are found, on balance, not to fully translate into the officer setting.
In fact, one rationale in particular-judicial respect for the board's governance
role-strongly disfavors application of the rule to officers in those instances where
the board elects to pursue a claim of wrongdoing. The upshot is that courts should
more closely examine officer conduct than they now review director performance.
This is fitting given the central roles played by officers in our corporate system
and given that most of the recent corporate scandals involved significant wrong-
doing at the officer level. Fiduciary duty litigation then can be one further mech-
anism for attaining greater accountability from senior officers. Those companies
not wishing to expose officers to heightened liability risks may, by decision of the
board of directors, refrain from asserting rightful claims ex post, or may contract
around that risk ex ante, either by eliminating exposure to liability altogether or
substantially modifying it.
II. COMMENTARY AND CASE LAW
A. COMMENTARY
The prestigious American Law Institute's (ALI's) Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance apply the business judgment rule to corporate officers on the same terms
as it is applied to directors.' 4 In support of this position, the commentary states
as follows:
14- 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (Amer-
ican Law Institute 1994) [hereinafter AL PRINCIPLES]. Section 4.01 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows-
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Sound public policy points in the direction of holding officers to the same
duty of care and business judgment standards as directors, as does the little
case authority that exists on the applicability of the business judgment stan-
dard to officers, and the views of most commentators support this position.
15
As support for that assertion, the ALI cites the corporate law treatise written by
Professor Harry Henn and John Alexander, along with a dictum from a 1971
Delaware Chancery Court decision. 16 The Henn and Alexander treatise, last up-
dated in 1983, boldly states that the business judgment rule "is no less applicable
to officers in the exercise of their authority,"' 7 but cites no supporting decisions.
Instead, it refers to the 1975 edition of Fletcher's well known corporate law trea-
tise.18 The Fletcher treatise, in turn, states that the rule "generally applies to de-
cisions of executive officers as well as those of directors." 19 As authority, Fletcher
cites two Delaware opinions addressing the subject through dicta, 20 one of which
contains the dictum relied on by the ALI.2' As it turns out, then, the views of
"most commentators"-to which the ALI referred 22-rest on very slender support.
The commentary to the Model Business Corporation Act makes a similar broad
statement: "[T]he business judgment rule will normally apply to decisions within
an officer's discretionary authority.'" 23 No authority is cited for this assertion, how-
ever. Experienced corporate law practitioner Charles Hansen also concludes that
"as a matter of precedent, and as a matter of sound policy, it seems clear that
officers do and should have the protection of the rule. '24 Mr. Hansen, unlike
others, cites several cases,25 although, as indicated in sub-Part B below, those cases
§ 4.01 Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment Rule
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's
functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be
expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. This Subsection (a) is
subject to the provisions of Subsection (c) (the business judgment rule) where applicable....
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty under
this Section if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested [§ 1.23) in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director
or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.
Id.
15. Id. at 140.
16. Id. at 186. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 242, at 663 (3d
ed. 1983); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
17. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 663.
18. Id. (citing 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 1029-39 (1975)).
19. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 38.
20. Id. at 42 (citing Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970) and Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d
119 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
21. 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
22. See supra note 14.
23. 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.42 cmt., at 8-265 (3d ed. Supp. 1998/99).
24. Charles Hansen, The Business Judgment Rule: Is There Any Doubt It Applies To Officers?, CORP.,
at 15 (Aspen Law & Bus. Sept. 1, 2001).
25. Id. at 16-17 (citing, among other cases, Para-Med. Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P2d 717 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987)).
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do not support the rule in nearly as strong a fashion as Hansen contends. Other
notable commentators favoring extension of the business judgment rule to cor-
porate officers include Professor Stephen Bainbridge, 26 and Professors Lawrence
Hamermesh and Gilchrist Sparks.2 7 Finally, in their exhaustive treatise on the
business judgment rule, Dennis Block and co-authors place existing legal au-
thority in proper perspective: "Numerous courts have referred to the business
judgment rule as a doctrine protecting directors and officers without distinguish-
ing between the rule's applicability to officers as opposed to directors. There is,
however, only sparse case law that specifically addresses this question."28
Existing commentary does not make--or even attempt to make-a very com-
pelling policy case for extending the business judgment rule to officers but, in-
stead, largely recites case law. That case law, it turns out, is actually quite "sparse. "29
Does the little law that exists really support the bold claims that so much com-
mentary makes for it?
B. CASE LAW
1. Delaware Law
The Delaware Supreme Court routinely states that the rule covers officers and
directors when it recites the rule in actions involving only directors.30 The court,
however, has never held that the rule applies to corporate officers acting in that
capacity In a 1970 decision, Kelly v. Bell, 31 the Supreme Court, in affirming a
Chancery Court decision, 32 broadly stated that "the directors or officers were not
necessarily liable to the corporation because they honored the commitment, pro-
26. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 6.4, at 285-86 (2002). Professor
Bainbridge acknowledges that it is "less well-settled" that officers should get the benefit of the business
judgment rule, as compared to directors. Id.
27. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 6, at 230, 237. Mr. Sparks and Professor Hamermesh
recite extensive case law in support of their policy position favoring application of the business judg-
ment rule to officers. As developed in sub-Part B, this author believes that today's more abundant
decisional law supporting the rule in that context is weaker than Sparks and Hamermesh, writing in
1992, contend.
28. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DunEs OF CoRPoRATE Di-
RECTORS 97-98 (5th ed. 1998) (emphasis added). The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section
of Business Law has stated that the business judgment rule "in appropriate circumstances should be
available to officers." Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act
Pertaining to the Standards of Conductfor Officers; Inspection Rights and Notices-Final Adoption, 54 Bus.
LAw. 1229, 1230 (1999). The Committee goes on, however, to rightly acknowledge the "limited case
law" and to describe that law as "muddled" by various factors. Id. These statements are more muted
than the statement in the Model Business Corporation Act's Official Comment. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
29. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 28.
30. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). For Delaware Chancery Court decisions reciting
the rule's applicability to corporate officers in dicta, see Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 6, at 232
& nn. 107-08. For a collection of cases from numerous jurisdictions reciting the rule's applicability
to corporate officers in dicta, see BLOCK ET AL., supra note 28, at 98 n.456 (and 2002 Supp. at 119).
31. Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970).
32. Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969).
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vided they exercised honest business judgment ... "33 The lower court earlier had
stated, "[ulnder the circumstances of this case ... the Ibusiness judgment rule]
is applicable to the executive officers ... "34 These statements, however, were
made in a case that sought money damages against only the directors, not the
officers. Moreover, the case raised a delegation of responsibility issue and, because
the directors had not initially approved the challenged transaction but had, none-
theless, later proceeded with it, the case involved director ratification of earlier
officer action. 35 The case most assuredly, however, did not involve a challenge to
the independent action of officers qua officers properly acting within their official
sphere. The Kelly case, therefore, contains a broad dictum but little else in support
of according business judgment rule protection to corporate officers.
Likewise, Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,36 a 1971 Chancery Court decision citing
Kelly, 37 states that a decision of executive officers "may" come within the business
judgment rule. 38 Moreover, the Chancellor went on to say the rule "probably"
applied at bar, "in the light of subsequent ratification by the board of directors.
39
In other words, Kaplan specifically linked application of the business judgment
rule to board action. Furthermore, given what he called "conflicts in the record 
'4
0
the Chancellor stated that he preferred to base his conclusions on findings from
the record, "and not on the broad cutting edge of the Rule."
41 Thus, application
of the business judgment rule to officers did not supply the ground for decision
in the Kaplan case.
Recalling that the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance and Fletcher's treatise
ultimately relied on these two Delaware decisions as the basis for their strong
claims in favor of extending the rule to corporate officers, 42 those cases turn out
to provide rather flimsy backing for that position. Do other decisions applying
Delaware law support broad application of the business judgment rule to cor-
porate officers?
Over the past few years, two non-Delaware courts, along with the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware, have applied Delaware law to conclude that
33. Kelly, 266 A.2d at 879.
34. Kelly, 254 A.2d at 75.
35. This is seen in the Delaware Supreme Court's phrasing: "[Tlhe directors or officers were not
necessarily liable to the corporation because they honored the [nonauthorized] commitment .. "Kelly,
266 A.2d at 879 (emphasis added)- Thus, although the board made no initial considered decision
that could be the subject of business judgment rule protection, in later electing to honor the com-
mitment, the board at least impliedly ratified the officers' actions, if indeed it did not, at that later
time, make its own belated business judgment. The court's statement quoted above (see supra text
accompanying note 33) goes on specifically to premise upholding the challenged action on the exercise
of business judgment, suggesting the Delaware Supreme Court believed the directors' later decision
to "honor" the commitment to be such an exercise of judgment.
36. Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971).
37. Id. at 124.
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 125.
41. Id.
42. See supra notes 16, 20 and accompanying text.
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the business judgment rule does protect corporate officers.43 A 1997 Minnesota
Court of Appeals decision, Potter v. Pohlad,44 involved an action against three
persons who had served as corporate officers, two of whom also had served as
directors. Thus, as to the third officer, who was not a director, application of the
business judgment rule was squarely at issue. The court, citing the Fletcher treatise
for support, 45 held the rule applicable to the corporate officer.46 The court noted
that an officer's responsibilities may be more extensive than those of a director
and that the "level" of fiduciary duty owed might be affected by circumstances.
47
The court, moreover, acknowledged that corporate officers were agents and, as
such, owed an obligation to disclose material information to the board,48 but
oddly, the court measured performance of that duty by the gross negligence stan-
dard applicable in Delaware to directors, 49 not the ordinary negligence standard
typically governing agents. 50 Concluding that plaintiff had not offered evidence
of gross negligence, the court affirmed summary judgment for the officers .5 Al-
though Potter applied the business judgment rule to shield a corporate officer on
the same basis as directors, the ruling reached that result only by ignoring the
fiduciary duty implications of the admitted agency status of the officer. Had the
court appreciated that officers are not fiduciaries for the same reason as directors,
but owe stricter duties due to their agency status, it might have been more reluc-
tant to grant the officer the same highly deferential business judgment review
given directors.
A 2003 decision from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington applied Delaware law and held the business judgment rule applicable to
corporate officers. 2 In support, however, the decision relied on cases that utterly
fail to uphold that proposition. The cases cited involve only directors,53 or, in one
case, a controlling shareholder.5 4 As to the standard of care, the court confusingly
articulated two standards. 55 In one place, the court stated that intentional or
43. Stanziale v. Nachtomi, No. CIVA.01-403 KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7375 (D. Del. Apr. 20,
2004); Grassmueck v. Barnett, No. C03-122P, 2003 WL 22128263 (WD. Wash. July 7, 2003); Potter
v. Pohlad, 560 N.W2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
44. 560 N.W2d 389.
45. Id. at 391-92.
46. Id. at 395.
47. Id. at 391-92 n.1.
48. Id. at 394.
49. Id. at 395. For another case inexplicably applying a gross negligence standard to a fiduciary
duty claim against a corporate officer, see Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 E Supp. 1256, 1270
(D.D.C. 1993).
50. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 10, at 34; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 & cmt.
(1958) (agents owe duty of ordinary care).
51. Potter, 560 N.W2d at 395.
52. Grassmueck v. Barnett, No. C03-122P, 2003 WL 22128263, at *3 (WD. Wash. July 7, 2003).
53. FDIC v. Castetter, 184 E3d 1040, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1999); Seafirst Corp. v. Jenkins, 644 F
Supp. 1152, 1158-59 (WD. Wash. 1986); Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 728 P2d 597,
601 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
54. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971).
55. Grassmueck, 2003 WL 22128263, at *3-*4.
HeinOnline  -- 60 Bus. Law 445 2004-2005
446 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, February 2005
knowing breaches of due care are needed to overcome the business judgment
rule,56 although in another place, the court ruled that the plaintiff had sufficiently
pleaded that the defendants had negligently breached their duties.57 In any event,
the plaintiff alleged self dealing on the part of the officer, thereby making the rule
inapplicable under a well established exception.
58
A 2004 decision from the federal court for the District of Delaware, applying
Delaware law, extended the business judgment rule to corporate officers and dis-
missed an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty59 The plaintiff alleged that the
officers had breached their fiduciary duties (stated to be those of care, loyalty, and
good faith) in various ways, including the failure to inform the directors of various
problems. The court, citing a Delaware decision pertaining to directors,
60 held
that an officer is not responsible for losses that result from a good faith decision.
6
1
Determining that plaintiff's allegations of bad faith were only conclusory, the court
dismissed the complaint.
62
Absent from the court's analysis was any serious attention to the breach of duty
of care allegation, liability for which officers, unlike directors, are not exculpated.
Even more problematic was the court's dismissive treatment of the failure of the
plaintiff to substantiate her allegation. The court stated that the plaintiff had not
explained how that failure violated the officers' fiduciary duty and had not offered
any authority in support. 63 Perhaps the plaintiff did fail in that regard, but such
a failure by a corporate officer-who is an agent owing strong fiduciary duties
64-
can readily constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, as, for example, the report by
the Enron Bankruptcy Examiner reveals. 65 Acknowledging such a duty would
have allowed the federal court to highlight-and differentiate-the governance
role of senior officers to report to the board exercising its oversight responsibilities.
Instead, the court treated officers the same as directors and gave them broad
shelter under the business judgment rule.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id. at *4.
58. Self dealing claims implicate the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of care and, consequently,
courts abandon business judgment review in favor of a more demanding fairness review. See, e.g.,
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988).
59. Stanziole v. Nachtomi, No. CIVA. 01-403 KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7375 (D. Del. Apr. 20,
2004).
60. Id. at *7 (citing Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at *6.
63. Id. at *7.
64. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 10.
65. In re Enron Corp., Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Final Report of Neil Batson,
Court-Appointed Examiner, at 4, 9-10, 104-10 (Nov. 4, 2003). See also supra note 50 and accom-
panying text.
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A fourth decision applying Delaware law refused to apply the business judg-
ment rule to a corporate officer.66 In Platt v. Richardson,6 7 the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania stated that the business judgment rule
"applies only to directors of a corporation and not to officers ... defendant does
not cite a single authority which extends the presumption afforded by the business
judgment rule to officers of a corporation and we have found none."68 The court
did not refer to the Kaplan or Kelly cases and, as a result, certain commentators
have criticized Platt.69 Perhaps the court made a strong statement about the lack
of authority for extending the business judgment rule to corporate officers when
viewed from the vantage point of the year 2005, given an additional sixteen years
of cases uncritically repeating dicta from a tiny handful of earlier decisions. 70 Yet,
at the time of the Platt decision-1989-Delaware had not, and still has not, held
the rule applicable to corporate officers. Moreover, hardly any of the other deci-
sions stating that the rule covers officers had yet been decided. 71 At the time it
was made, therefore, the statement was not far from accurate in describing the
state of the law.
2. Non-Delaware Law
Decisions applying law other than Delaware's appear to support application of
the business judgment rule to officers, 72 but, in fact, the case law is quite mixed
and provides substantially less support for that position than is commonly ac-
knowledged. For example, a 1994 Illinois appellate decision, 73 before criticizing
the Platt decision as "against the substantial weight of judicial authority from other
jurisdictions ... ,"4 stated unequivocally that a significant number of courts from
66. Platt v. Richardson, CIV No. 88-0144, 1989 WL 159584, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 1989). Sparks
& Hamermesh, supra note 6, at 235, cite an additional case applying Delaware law-Massaro v.
Vernitron Corp., 559 F Supp. 1068 (D. Mass. 1983)-but that case did not involve corporate officers
or directors as defendants. Rather, that decision involved an odd claim against the corporation itself
for mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty and should have been dismissed on that basis for
failure to state a claim. See infra note 79 (noting that a corporation is owed fiduciary duties; it does
not owe them).
67. CIV No. 88-0144, 1989 WL 159584 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 1989).
68. Id. at *2. The defendant may not have cited any authority because, at the time, there was not
very much authority to cite. Delaware courts had issued only dicta and no other courts applying
Delaware law had yet held that the business judgment rule covers officers. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 66.
69. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 6, at 235 (calling it a "distinct minority position");
Hansen, supra note 24, at 16 (citing Sparks & Hamermesh and stating Platt was "handed down in
ignorance of the existing precedents .. ."). In fact, when the decision came down, there were no
governing precedents. See supra note 68.
70. See infra notes 73-112 and accompanying text.
71. At the time of the Platt decision, one decision had held the rule applicable to officers under
Washington law, Para-Medical Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P2d 717, 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), and
another court had held the rule inapplicable under California law. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See also Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Adriance Mach.
Works, Inc., 76 F2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding that business judgment rule applied to officers).
72. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 28, at 98 n.456 & 2002 Supp. at 119 (collecting decisions).
73. Selcke v. Bove, 629 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
74. Id. at 750.
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other jurisdictions "have clearly articulated that the business judgment rule pro-
tects corporate officers as well as corporate directors."
75 The court then cites ten
cases.76 One of these was the Kaplan decision, already discussed,
77 which named
only directors as defendants. Two decisions involved claims against corporations.
78
One of these two involved an odd claim against the corporation itself for mis-
management and breach of fiduciary duty;79 neither of the two actions were
against corporate officers. A fourth decision involved only directors as defen-
dants.80 A fifth decision involved a person who purportedly was the sole stock-
holder and also both a director and President, but who never actively participated
in management, being President in name only
8 Consequently, the case did not
address the issue of whether an officer acting qua officer receives business judg-
ment review8s2 The sixth decision described the defendants as "officers and direc-
tors" without indicating whether any were only officers or sued only in their
capacity as officers rather than as officers and directors.
8 3 The decision, therefore,
tells us nothing about business judgment rule review for officers as officers. The
seventh decision involved a person who was only an officer but the legal signif-
icance of his status-as distinguished from that of defendants who were direc-
tors-was never explicitly addressed by the court.
8 4
Only three of the ten decisions cited by the Selcke court squarely applied the
business judgment rule to officers.85 Two of these involved nonpublic compa-
nies,86 one of which-Omnibank of Mantee v. United Southern Bank
87-found after
trial that the officer had breached the duty of reasonable care he owed to the
corporation as its agent.88 The court inexplicably asserted that "[t]he duty of care
is subject to a well settled common law defense, known as the business judgment
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
78. Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 E Supp. 1068 (D. Mass. 1983); McKnight v. Midwest Eye Inst.,
Inc., 799 S.W2d 909 (Mo. App. 1990).
79. Massaro, 559 F Supp. at 1070. The lawsuit is odd because a corporation itself typically does
not owe fiduciary duties, rather, it is owed fiduciary duties from directors and officers.
80. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 627 F Supp. 901 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
81. McDonnell v. Am. Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974).
82. The case also stated that only "reasonable" acts were protected by the business judgment rule
and that defendant's actions were not reasonable. Id. at 384.
83. FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F Supp. 441 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
84. Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Sparks and Hamermesh
believe the Detwiler court's failure to distinguish among the defendants based on officer versus director
status supports application of the business judgment rule to officers. Sparks & Hamermesh, supra
note 6, at 236. This author reaches a different conclusion. The court seemed utterly unaware that the
liability of corporate officers might stand on a different basis than that of directors. See Johnson &
Millon, supra note 10. The court's failure to address the rule's application to a corporate officer more
likely reflects an unawareness of the issue rather than its head-on resolution.
85. AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F Supp. 1365, 1376-77 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Omnibank of Mantee
v. United So. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 1992); Para-Med. Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P2d 717
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
86. Omnibanh of Mantee, 607 So. 2d 76; Para-Med. Leasing, Inc., 739 P2d 717.
87. Omnibank of Mantee, 607 So. 2d 76.
88. Id. at 87.
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rule."89 The court, citing the ALI's codification of the business judgment rule,90
then applied a lower "rational basis" standard of review to the officer's conduct,
concluding he failed that lower standard as well. 9'
The Omnibank case is a wonderful illustration of judicial confusion concerning
the interplay between an officer's duty of care as an agent and the business judg-
ment rule. The court rightly determined that a corporate officer is an agent and,
as such, is liable to his or her principal for losses caused by the agent's misdeeds. 92
That conclusion should have ended the analysis. Going on, however, to apply the
ALI's unsupported position that the business judgment rule applies to officers as
well as directors, 93 the court, in effect, abandoned its earlier agency law duty of
reasonable care analysis in favor of applying the weaker standard advocated by
the ALl. The effect, never acknowledged by the court (or the ALl), is to jettison
the well established standard of ordinary care required of officers in their capacity
as agents. 94 Applying the business judgment rule to officers in this manner
wrongly relieves them of the well settled duty to comply with a negligence stan-
dard of care. Applying the rule to directors, on the other hand, is fully consistent
with a policy of according directors deference in the exercise of judgment, by
means of a gross negligence standard of care. 95 Here we clearly see how failure to
distinguish the role of officers from the role of directors in our system of corporate
governance leads to a failure to appreciate the different reasons for imposing
fiduciary duties on each group, which, in turn, leads to a failure to differentiate
between them for purposes of applying the business judgment rule.
Another decision cited by Selcke in support of applying the business judgment
rule to corporate officers-the only one involving a public company-acknowl-
edged the business judgment rule but denied defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground that the plaintiff, by alleging recklessness, illegality, and a lack of
reasonable care, had overcome the rule.96 Finally, the tenth case cited by Selcke in
support of extending the business judgment rule to officers, stands alone in ex-
plicitly applying the business judgment rule to exonerate a corporate officer from
liability 97 That decision, however, like Omnibank, stunningly misapplied the busi-
ness judgment rule in the officer setting.
Para-Medical Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen98 represents a complete failure to uphold
an officer's fiduciary duty to act with due care by deploying the business judgment
rule to nullify that duty Hangen, the defendant, was a certified public accountant
who was hired as interim manager for a small vehicle and equipment leasing
89. Id. at 85.
90. Id. at 84. See supra note 14.
91. Omnibank of Mantee, 607 So. 2d at 88.
92. Id. at 84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 cmt. a (1958); Johnson & Milton, supra
note 10.
93. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
96. AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F Supp. 1365, 1376-77 (S.D. Fla. 1991). For further discussion
of Bomar, see infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
97. Para-Med. Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P2d 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
98. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 60 Bus. Law 449 2004-2005
450 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, February 2005
company The sole shareholder and sole director gave him a written description
of his duties and a four page procedures manual for reference in arranging leases
on behalf of the company Hangen entered into two leases with a business losing
money and already in default on an existing lease with Hangen's employer. On
one lease, Hangen did not follow the procedures specified in the manual, with
the result that he failed to obtain documentation revealing the lessee's poor fi-
nancial condition. On the other lease, structured as a sale-leaseback, Hangen
advanced $22,000 of borrowed money to purchase a vehicle from the financially
distressed counterparty No lease documents were signed and the counter-party
defaulted without making any lease payments.
The corporation sued Hangen under Washington law for breaching the fidu-
ciary duty of care he owed under agency law. The court acknowledged the plain-
tiff's contention that agents owe a duty of ordinary care, 99 the same duty set forth
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency."°° The court held, however, that, for cor-
porate officers, the business judgment rule overrode the agent's duty of care,
stating: "[in considering the actions of a corporate officer, however, the business
judgment rule rather than the standard of ordinary care applies."''1 The plaintiff
had strongly urged that no precedent supported application of the rule to cor-
porate officers, pointing out, correctly, that the Fletcher treatise cited only holdings
involving directors. The court, however, referred to the Henn and Alexander trea-
tise-which, as noted earlier,102 simply points to Fletcher-and three additional
cases involving directors. 0 3 Thus, without any precedent in support, the court
thoughtlessly transported the business judgment rule into the officer setting,
thereby lowering the well established standard of care applicable to agents and
enabling a very incompetent manager to escape liability
The Hangen decision embodies the danger of cavalierly stating, as does the ALI
and other commentary,0 4 that the business judgment rule applies to corporate
officers. That decision, ironically, is one of the very few that even acknowledges,
in the context of a claim against an officer, that an agent owes the corporate
principal a duty of ordinary care. 1" 5 The court, however, undermined that more
robust duty by means of the business judgment rule. Applying the business judg-
ment rule to officers in this fashion creates a substantial risk that the longstanding
confusion concerning the relationship of that rule to the duty of care now reigning
in the director context will be imported into the officer context as well.
1 6
The same judicial "bootstrapping" on miscited authority seen in Selcke is evident
in other cases where courts state unequivocally that the business judgment rule
applies to officers. Thus, as authority for the position that the business judgment
rule applies to corporate officers on the same basis as directors, these decisions
99. Id. at 722.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958).
101. Para-Med. Leasing, Inc., 739 P.2d at 722.
102. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
103. Para-Med. Leasing, Inc., 739 P.2d at 721.
104. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
105. Para-Med. Leasing, Inc., 739 P.2d at 722.
106. See infra notes 120, 132 and accompanying text.
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simply are not well supported. For example, in FDIC v. Stahl,'0 7 the Southern
District of Florida court applied the business judgment rule to officers after citing
four cases in support. 108 One of the cases, AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 0 9 did indeed
state that the business judgment rule applied to officers, but did so in reliance on
three cases-the other three cases relied on by Stahl-which involved only direc-
tors."0 Moreover, the Bomar court ruled that plaintiff's allegations had overcome
the rule."' Thus, the blanket statement in Stahl is based only on the blanket
statement in Bomar, which, in turn, is based on cases involving only directors.1
2
This detailed, and admittedly critical, review of decisional law is not meant to
suggest that an established principle of law cannot be extended into another
context. Our common law system allows growth by operating in just that fashion.
It is to insist, however, that if a principle is extended solely on the basis of pre-
cedent, then the precedent should accurately support the proposition for which
it is cited. Even today, however, judicial authority for extending the business
judgment rule to corporate officers remains quite "sparse."' 3 Without persuasive
precedent, a compelling policy case for expanding the principle should be made.
In asserting that the business judgment rule applies to officers, however, that is
virtually never done, either by courts or commentators.
Importantly, many of the courts that do apply what they call the business
judgment rule tend to be vigilant both in deploying the rule as an adjunct to the
duty of due care (rather than, as in Omnibank and Hangen, a substitute for that
duty) and in predicating the rule on an officer first fulfilling that duty as measured
by a negligence, not gross negligence, standard." 4 For example, in Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Gladstone," 5 the court applied the business judgment rule to a corporate
officer." 6 The court, however, noted that the rule only protected officers who had
acted with due care, which the court described as a standard of "ordinary care."'1
7
In other words, the business judgment rule was not wrongly used, as in Hangen
and Omnibank, to nullify an officer's duty of care; rather, the exercise of due care
was a precondition to application of the rule. This is true as well in a Second
107. FDIC v. Stahl, 854 E Supp. 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'g and rev'd on other grounds, 89 E3d
1510 (11th Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 1570 n.8.
109. 757 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. 1991).
110. Int'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F2d 1447 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc.,
849 E2d 570 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Schein v: Caesar's World Inc., 491 F2d 17 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 838 (1974).
111. AmeriFirst Bank, 757 E Supp. at 1377.
112. The same pattern is true in Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., No. 01-A-01-9510-CH-00430,
1996 WL 355074 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1996) (citing WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CY-
CLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPOATIONS), aff'g and rev'd on other grounds, 957 S.W2d 536
(Tenn. 1997).
113. This is Dennis Block's apt description. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
114. Many jurisdictions outside Delaware do this with respect to directors as well. See, e.g., FDIC
v Stahl, 89 F3d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Florida law); FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F2d 124,
130 n.13 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law); Schein, 491 F2d at 18 (applying Florida law).
115. 895 F Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1994).
116. Id. at 369.
117. Id.
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Circuit decision relied on by the Selcke court, McDonnell v. American Leduc Petro-
leums, Ltd."" In fact, Selcke itself acknowledges, in the director setting, that the
protection of the business judgment rule might be surmounted through proving
a lack of due care by means of negligence." 9 In actually applying the business
judgment rule to corporate officers, therefore, these courts require full compliance
with the officer's duty of care and protect-as they should-only noncareless
mistakes of business judgment.
Essentially, that same result can be achieved without invoking the business
judgment rule at all. The judicial inquiry should focus pointedly on whether the
officer did or did not fulfill the duty of due care. If the duty was fulfilled, the
inquiry is over and the plaintiff loses; if the duty was not fulfilled, the liability
inquiry is over and the plaintiff wins whatever damages were caused by breach
of the duty 20 Unless the business judgment rule is wrongly being used to lower
or nullify the standard of care owed by an officer-an improper use as seen in
Omnibank and Hangen-its sole function is to preclude courts from resolving the
due care issue by means of evaluating, in hindsight, the overall substantive wis-
dom of the business decision. Under no circumstances, however, should courts
be engaged in such substantive "second-guessing" in their fiduciary duty analysis.
An example of a decision that rightly focused on the issue of due care in this
manner is Shields v. Cape Fox Corp. 121 There, a manager was held liable for breach-
ing the ordinary care (negligence) standard of agency law without also applying
the business judgment rule, even though the rule was applied to directors. 22 In
another case, involving a nonprofit organization, Brown v. United Cerebral Palsy,
Inc. ,123 the New Jersey Superior Court held that a manager-the Executive Direc-
tor-would be liable to her employer under agency principles if she were negli-
gent.' 24 Although not expressly invoking the business judgment rule, the court
recognized that some agents exercise judgmental discretion. Consequently, the
court sought to differentiate mistakes of judgment from negligence. 25 Although
the court, in this author's view, wrongly injected a substantive component into its
definition of negligence by defining it as conduct no "reasonable person" would
engage in,' 26 rather than as conduct that, from a decision making process stand-
point was faulty, the distinction drawn by the court rightly suggests that a person
118. McDonnell v. Am. Leduc Petroleums, Ltd. 491 F2d 380, 384 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that
under California law, "The business judgment rule protects only reasonable acts of a director or
officer.").
119. Selcke v. Bove, 629 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Accord Rosenfield v. Metals Selling
Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994) (holding that the business judgment rule protects officer
decisions from judicial review where due care exercised).
120. For a similar argument that due care, not the business judgment rule, should be the focal
point in the analysis of director fiduciary duty, see Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule,
55 Bus. LAw. 625 (2000).
121. Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P3d 1083 (Alaska 2002).
122. Id.
123. 650 A.2d 848 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
124. Id. at 852.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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could act in a reasonable manner and yet make the wrong decision. Such a person
should incur no liability
The Brown decision, with the modification noted above, suggests a way to
harmonize the agent's fiduciary duty of ordinary care with the need to protect
agents-including corporate officers-from liability for decisions that turn out
poorly but were not negligently made. It is not the province of the business
judgment rule to excuse an officer from the obligation to exercise ordinary care;
its true function is to prohibit retrospectively using a judgment's poor outcome
to conclude that due care was not exercised. This distinction captures as well the
Second Restatement of Agency's reconciliation of the agent's fiduciary duty of care
with the agent's understandable need to exercise discretion. The Restatement
states that an agent with discretion is "under a duty to act competently and care-
fully and for a mistake in judgment resulting from a failure to have the standard
knowledge or to use the standard care, he is subject to liability to the principal. "127
Judgments made carefully, on the other hand, do not create liability, however they
turn out.
In sum, both commentary and case law greatly overstate the extent of decisional
law support for according business judgment rule protection to officers on the
same broad basis as directors. The policy case for that position remains unex-
amined because courts and commentators rarely develop it. Part III outlines the
policy arguments customarily offered in favor of affording directors favorable busi-
ness judgment rule protection and Part IV assesses the applicability of those ra-
tionales to corporate officers.
III. POLICY RATIONALES FOR THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The case law in support of applying the business judgment rule to corporate
officers is less substantial than commonly thought. Moreover, most decisions ap-
plying the rule are relatively new; most of them were decided in the last fifteen
years. It seems appropriate, therefore, to ask whether the rule can be supported
on policy grounds. This first requires a brief summary of the business judgment
rule and identification of the key policy rationales for deploying the rule in the
director context. These appear, respectively, in "A" and "B" below.
A. BACKGROUND
The business judgment rule is the cornerstone concept in the judicial review
of corporate conduct. Courts have addressed the business judgment rule on
countless occasions.12 Practicing lawyers frequently assess the business judgment
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 cmt. c (emphasis added). See also infra notes 198-
199.
128. See Michael J. Kennedy, The Business Judgment Syllogism-Premises Governing Board Activity
285, 327 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B01-01DE, 2002), available at WL
1316 PLI/Corp 285 (stating that there are "perhaps thousands ... of cases that peel the onion of the
business judgment rule's parameters").
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rule's elements and reach, 129 and scholars regularly analyze its underpinnings.
30
Although broadly applicable to the judicial review of board conduct, the defer-
ential protection of the rule is not applied as strictly in some settings-e.g., in the
judicial review of a board's response to a hostile tender offer or in reviewing a
special litigation committee's decision to terminate derivative litigation. For all
the attention lavished on the rule, however, Henry Manne's statement about the
rule remains as true in 2005 as when first made in 1967: the business judgment
rule is "one of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field."
131
There exists, to be sure, deep-rooted disagreement about the basic purpose and
thrust of the business judgment rule. Much of this disagreement probably stems
from profound differences of opinion concerning the rule's proper relationship to
the director duty of care,'132 and, hence, differences as to the degree of deference
that courts, applying the rule, should accord director judgments. Notwithstanding
a wide range of views on the precise contours and underpinnings of the rule,
however, certain core statements about the rule are widely accepted. For example,
the rule has both a procedural dimension and substantive force; thus, in Delaware,
the rule, procedurally, is described as a "presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." 133 From this simple statement-and later case law elaboration'
34 -
several undisputed points about the Delaware rule emerge. The rule applies to
directors;' 35 the rule applies to directors when they act collectively, that is, as a
board or as a committee of the board; 136 the rule applies only to considered
129. For particularly good treatments, see BLOCK ET AL., supra note 28; R. Franklin Balotti &James
J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAw. 1337 (1993); Bayless Manning, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477 (1984);
S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
130. Recent scholarly treatments include Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule-The
Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631 (2002); Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment
Rule, 55 Bus. LAw. 625 (2000); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, The Business Judgment Rule, 2000
Wis. L. REV. 573 (2000); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrinds Education: Using Dickens and
Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the BusinessJudgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799 (1997); Franklin
A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion? 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
287 (1994). A somewhat older, but truly excellent treatment of the rule is Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of
the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment
Rule, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 591 (1983).
131. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270
(1967).
132. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 130; Cohn, supra note 130; Johnson, supra note 130.
133. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
134. A useful statement of the rule's elements is found in Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
135. Id.; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
136. Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 812-13. See also R. Franklin Balotti &Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care,
Conduct, and Liability: The Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 Bus. LAW. 35, 56 (2000) ("the
business judgment rule applies both to the decision and to the decision-maker, whereas [a statutory
section] addresses only the individual liability of a director.").
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director judgments, not to unconsidered inaction; 137 directors must be indepen-
dent and disinterested as to the matter acted upon;138 directors must act with due
care and in good faith; 139 the due care inquiry is process-oriented and due care
is measured by a standard of gross negligence, not simple negligence; 4° the bur-
den of proof is on the party challenging the board's decision to establish facts
rebutting the presumption in favor of upholding the decision.'41 Unless a plaintiff
succeeds in rebutting the rule, the court will not substitute its views for those of
the board's if the latter's decision can be "attributed to any rational business pur-
pose. " 142 This last point reflects the well known substantive deference shown by
courts to board decisions. As a result of this "hands off" approach, plaintiffs rarely
win duty of care cases.
143
B. POLICY RATIONALES FOR DEFERENCE TO DIRECTORS
Several policy rationales are said to underlie the business judgment rule.'-
Although expressed in various ways, these rationales fall into three broad cate-
gories. 14 5 These are as follows: encouraging directors to serve and take risks; 1
46
avoiding judicial encroachment into business decisions; and preserving the board's
central decision making role in corporate governance. These rationales will each
be briefly described.
1. Encouraging Directors to Serve and Take Risks
Courts recognize that competent directors can make decisions that in hindsight
were improvident.'4 7 If those decisions result in a company losing a significant
amount of money, a legal rule holding directors too readily liable for the loss will
deter persons from serving as directors. Consequently, a legal rule-i.e., the busi-
ness judgment rule-that makes it difficult to hold directors personally liable for
137. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 ("the business judgment rule operates only in the context of director
action. Technically speaking, it has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or
absent a conscious decision, failed to act.") (citation omitted).
138. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
139. Id.
140. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 n.31 (Del. 1993); Smith v: Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
141. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
142. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 nn.65 & 66.
143. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 4.01 cmt. h, at 155. Only forty or so twentieth century
cases had reached appellate review as of 1992. Id.
144. See supra notes 129-130 (reciting policy rationales).
145. But see Gevurtz, supra note 130, at 304-21 (describing four categories); Davis, supra note 130
(describing five categories).
146. Many courts apparently differentiate the factor of encouraging persons to serve as directors
from the factor of encouraging persons to take risks while directors. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 28,
at 12-14. This author treats the two factors together because they raise the same policy issue and
because the aim of sound policy should be the attainment of right action while a director, not merely
inducing someone to become a director.
147. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 28, at 12 & n.49 (collecting authority).
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improvident decisions "encourages competent individuals to become directors
who otherwise might decline for fear of personal liability"'1
48
Once directors are willing to serve, they must be induced to make those busi-
ness decisions stockholders desire. Given limited liability for corporate debts and
the ability to alleviate risk through diversifying their portfolio of stock holdings,
49
stockholders may prefer that directors take more risks than directors themselves
prefer, especially given that directors, holding relatively small amounts of stock,
will capture little of the eventual payoff. A judicial standard of review that too
severely imposes liability on directors for unwise decisions may exacerbate this
tendency toward "sub-optimal risk acceptance"150 and deter directors from pur-
suing potentially lucrative, but risky, endeavors. To more closely align director
attitudes toward risk with stockholder preferences, the business judgment rule is
designed to accord directors substantial latitude in their business decision mak-
ing.' 5' Delaware courts implement this philosophy by refusing to assess the sub-
stantive soundness of director judgments and by holding directors only to a gross
negligence standard of care.
2. Avoiding Judicial Encroachment into Business Decisions
Judges are public officials, not business people. This leads some commentators
to advocate that judges adopt a highly deferential approach in reviewing director
actions: "Courts ... do not possess the experience, expertise, or information nec-
essary to make complicated business decisions.' 52 Courts are quick to adopt this
rationale, asserting that they are not business experts,' 5 3 are ill-equipped to
second-guess business judgments, 5 4 and lack an intangible "sense" of the specific
circumstances confronting a business.
155
At a deeper level, several considerations support this posture of judicial re-
straint. First, courts worry about "hindsight bias," the tendency to "assign an
erroneously high probability of occurrence to a probabilistic event simply because
148. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Il1. 1989), aff'g, 897 F2d
1394 (7th Cir. 1990). See Cohn, supra note 130, at 599-600 nn.27, 30.
149. Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 112.
150. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
151. Id. at 1052-53. Former Chancellor William Allen's opinion in Gagliardi nicely elaborates this
risk inducing rationale for the rule, as does Judge Ralph Winter's opinion in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). See also William T. Allen et al., Realigning
the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and
Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449, 457 (2001).
152. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1982).
See also Balotti & Hanks, supra note 129, at 1341-42 (suggesting it is unwise to "risk ... permitting
or requiring ... courts to become, in effect, appellate boards of directors.").
153. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating "judges are not business
experts").
154. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that the business judgment
rule is grounded, in part, on the "prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently
called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments."). See generally BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 28, at 15-17 (collecting authority).
155. Branson, supra note 130, at 637.
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it ended up occurring."1 5 6 The deference of the business judgment rule properly
quells the temptation to overlook the fact that the "entrepreneur's function is to
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time
made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect
knowledge." 5 7 Second, directors who make faulty decisions already face the risk
of sanction, both from stockholders who may vote them out of office 58 and from
the corrective, competitive pressure of product, labor, and capital markets;
159
judges do not face these sanctions for faulty decisions.160 Recognizing that other
legal and market mechanisms hold directors, but not judges, to account, courts
defer to director decisions. Finally, drawing on the insights of behavioral econom-
ics, Professor Bainbridge argues that, like all decision makers candidly acknowl-
edging their own cognitive limitations and information asymmetries, judges sen-
sibly respond to these challenges by choosing-as their decision making strategy-
a policy of deferring to director judgments.' 6' Together, these three considerations
produce the judicial modesty that forms the essence of this second rationale for
the rule.
3. Preserving the Board's Governance Role
Courts frequently link the business judgment rule to that section of the cor-
porate statute providing that the business and affairs of a corporation are to be
managed by or under the direction of its board. 162 By limiting judicial review, "the
business judgment rule preserves the statutory scheme of centralizing authority
in the board of directors. "163 Conversely, too readily giving stockholders the ability
to challenge director decisions may serve to "transfer ultimate decision-making
authority from the board to any shareholder who is willing to sign a complaint."'"
Thus, a judicial policy of deference toward board action preserves director au-
156. Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 114 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 114-15.
157. Joy v. North, 692 F2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
158. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 E Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Nev. 1997) (noting
that "unhappy shareholders can always vote the directors out of office.").
159. Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F2d 1323, 1325 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "Itlhe press of market
forces ... will more effectively serve the interests of all participants than will an error-prone judicial
process."); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437,
1439-43 (1985).
160. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990) (no market
"mechanism 'selects out' judges who try to make business decisions."), rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S.
90 (1991).
161. Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 118-20. Bainbridge, however, does not believe this a complete
explanation of the business judgment rule. Id.
162. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del- 1993), modified, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
163. Michael Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware
Law and the Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw. 503, 522 (1989).
164. Michael Dooley, Not in the Corporation's Best Interests, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 45.
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thority against both stockholder and judicial intervention.165 This honors the cor-
porate governance arrangement designed by the legislature.
It is not the purpose of this Article to develop at great length or critically assess
these customary rationales for applying the business judgment rule to directors.
That has been done before. 66 The aim, rather, has been to identify the conven-
tional justifications for judicial deference to directors in order to frame the central
concern of this Article: do these rationales, or any of them, support application
of the business judgment rule to officers?
IV. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND OFFICERS
This section first evaluates whether the standard business judgment rule ra-
tionales apply, in whole or in part, to officers. It then provides an overall assess-
ment, concluding that policy considerations do not support application of the
rule to corporate officers. It also suggests how directors, stockholders, and state
legislatures might respond.
A. POLICY RATIONALES FOR DEFERENCE APPLIED TO OFFICERS
1. Encouraging Officers to Serve and Take Risks
Stockholders desire competent officers willing to serve in that capacity as much
as-perhaps more than-they desire competent directors. Moreover, stockholders
seek the same optimizing stance toward risky corporate investment opportunities
from officers as they do from directors. Must officers receive the protection of the
business judgment rule to induce them both to serve and act appropriately once
in office, as is the supposed case for directors? For several reasons, this is a
doubtful claim.
First, directors are said to need liability protection to induce risk taking because
their relatively small stockholdings and lack of incentive compensation give them
little of the "upside" gains on investment projects. 167 In other words, the "risk/
reward" ratio is highly unfavorable-they perceive too much risk for the expected
reward. By way of contrast, executive compensation-at least in the United
States-is, or at least is designed to be, highly incentivized. 168 Professors Brian
Cheffins and Randall Thomas report on the results of a 2001 worldwide remu-
165. See In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. CIV A. 11974, 1997 WL 257460, at *12 (Del.
Ch. May 13, 1997) ("[Tlhe board, not the Court, is in the best position to manage the corporation's
affairs.").
166. Many corporate law scholars are critical of the business judgment rule. Professor Gevurtz, for
example, advocates abolishing it. Gevurtz, supra note 130, at 305-12. Professor Bainbridge and this
author would not abolish the rule but each would, in different ways, prefer that the rule be used to
shelter director decisions from substantive review by courts. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 130;
Johnson, supra note 130.
167. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
168. Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Regulation and the Globalization (Americanization) of
Executive Pay, GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS-CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A
NEW EA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 155 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003).
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neration study compiled by Towers Perrin. 69 The study, they report, found that
much of an American CEO's compensation "is variable in nature, in the sense that
they only benefit if their company meets or exceeds prescribed targets."'7 0 In
particular, the annual bonus of a U.S. CEO averaged fifty-six percent of salary,
although other variable compensation (e.g., stock options and bonus plans with
multi-year targets) constituted 161 percent of salary. 7 ' The pattern seemed to
hold for other executives as well, the study finding, for example, that for human
resources directors' variable pay with a long term aspect amounted to sixty-six
percent of base salary 172 Overall, executive officers receive higher absolute levels
of pay than do directors,'173 and a significant portion of that pay is-or at least is
designed to be-based on performance. 17 4 In short, officers, unlike directors,
stand to reap substantial rewards for taking appropriate risks. Thus, even if the
risk element in the risk/reward ratio is the same as for directors, the reward
element is quite different, thereby substantially altering how an officer-in com-
parison to a director-makes this calculation.
Second, it is commonly observed that officers-more so than directors-have
risks inherent to their substantial firm specific human capital that cannot be re-
duced by diversification, 7 5 thus making officers adverse to taking risks stock-
holders desire. 76 This argument suggests officers will "play it safe" to protect their
jobs. Without more evidence to support such a wholesale claim, this does not
seem to be an accurate description of modem executive conduct. To begin with,
the widespread pattern of incentive compensation noted above is designed to
counteract risk-adverse conduct. Moreover, "playing it safe" suggests that the typ-
ical executive lacks ambition, preferring simply to hold onto his or her job at a
lower level of pay than to "take a chance" in hopes of advancing upward in the
corporate hierarchy and receiving far more in pay and perks. For executives who
climb to the top of the corporate ladder, it is unlikely that they either have "play
it safe" personality types or that they have successfully navigated their way up
169. Id. at 156-57.
170. Id. Interestingly, a 1993 change in federal tax law permitting a corporation to deduct more
than $1 million for an executive's compensation only if the additional compensation was "performance
related" did little to slow increases in executive pay and had only a moderate impact on the balance
between performance-related pay and salary. Id. at 170.
171. Id. at 157.
172. Id.
173. Median total direct compensation for chief executive officers at major U.S. corporations was
just over $3 million in 2002. Joann S. Lublin, Executive Pay Keeps Rising, Despite Outcry, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2003, at B1. By way of contrast, directors at Fortune 1000 firms were paid an average of
$89,000 in 2002. See Carol Hymowitz, How To Be A Good Director, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at RI.
174. For a critique of executive compensation practices in U.S. companies as not being sufficiently
performance based, see generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFOR-
MANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Harvard University Press 2004).
Care must be taken that executive pay arrangements are, in practice, truly performance based and
that they are not designed to "over-incentivize" officers in a way that tempts them to act imprudently
or, worse, commit fraud.
175. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 113.
176. Id.
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that ladder by means of a "play it safe" approach to business. 177 Nor is "playing
it safe" a cultural norm that is at all lauded in entrepreneurial circles or a norm
that very many corporate cultures in the United States highly value and seek to
encourage and reinforce.178 Additionally, in order to receive more pay via stock
price appreciation, officers must convince investors of good prospects for in-
creased future earnings; to be credible, this, in turn, requires innovation and a
willingness to take risks.
Furthermore, beyond individual motivation and corporate norms, the argu-
ment suggests that a "play it safe" strategy can prevail, notwithstanding that, in a
competitive, tournament-like labor market, other executives may defect from that
strategy and take risks and succeed. Their success will put pressure on the "play
it safe" executives to alter their ways or fail, and will make the risk taking executive
comparatively more attractive in the labor market. Indeed, the "safe player" may
be out of a job, because a strategy of "protecting" firm specific capital requires,
as it turns out, that an executive continue to meet (or exceed) the ongoing chal-
lenges of competitors.
Another flaw in the "firm specific" capital argument is the suggestion that sim-
ply because a great deal of an executive's wealth, in both absolute and relative
terms, may be tied up in company stock, the person is not otherwise wealthy
Over the years (and decades) it takes to reach the pinnacle of corporate positions,
many executives are likely to have acquired significant wealth and to have moved,
at least partially, to diversify their holdings. Consequently, the fact that, at a par-
ticular time, a senior executive is heavily invested in one company does not mean
the executive is not, from a broader wealth perspective, far more diversified.
Third, apart from the fact that officers receive significantly greater rewards from
a corporation than do directors, they also should face greater risks. Officers work
for the company full time, possess extensive knowledge and skill concerning
company affairs, have access to considerably more and better information than
directors, enjoy high company and social status, and exercise great influence over
the lives of many people-both inside and outside the corporation. They should
be held to the same standard of care as are all other persons who serve as agents
of companies-a duty of ordinary care. 179 If that standard of care is thought to
be too onerous to induce people to work, then apparently none of us would work,
whether in professions, trades, manufacturing, or other jobs where ordinary care
is the conventional standard of conduct. It seems unlikely, or at least it has not
been plausibly established, that corporate officers at even the highest echelons
would be less willing than other persons to pursue their livelihoods unless they
were given assurances of facing a lower liability risk. There is certainly no evidence
177. For an insightful treatment of how people with egocentric tendencies are valued in hyper-
competitive knowledge and service-based firms, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Organiza-
tional Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 968 (2002).
178. Id.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958). See also Johnson & Millon, supra note 10.
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that people are staying away from, 80 or resigning, high-level corporate positions
now that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes more onerous demands on execu-
tives.I8' In short, the claim that people will not serve as officers or take appropriate
risks unless the standard of care is reduced below the norm for all other employees
and agents is, so far, empirically unsupported and, overall, a highly dubious claim.
What this line of argument with respect to officers does reveal is that it is not
wholly the business judgment rule that protects directors from liability risk.
Rather, in Delaware and states like it, it is a very weak duty of care that permits
directors to deviate from the standard of ordinary care as long as they are not
grossly negligent. 82 Not discouraging the pursuit of prudent risks is one thing;
permitting carelessness in identifying, gathering information on, and assessing
those risks in the context of a business decision, is another. Moreover, even if
directors fail that generous liability standard, they are not personally liable for
ensuing damages due to widespread statutory exculpation. 183 These havens from
liability, however, are not the doing of the business judgment rule which, properly
understood, simply protects directors against liability for decisions that, though
carefully made, were, as it later turns out, mistakes.
184
Applying this to officers, we see that, as agents, they, unlike directors, should
be held to the customary standard of ordinary care.185 Moreover, in Delaware,
stockholders cannot exculpate officers from personal liability for carelessness.'
8 6
This is the default legal background against which officers choose to serve. Yet,
they neither refrain from serving or taking risks because of it, nor should these
existing liability rules-harsher than for directors-be curtailed through broadly
extending to officers the strong Delaware version of the business judgment rule
currently applied to directors. The first rationale does not support expanding the
rule to cover officers.
180. There are anecdotal reports that it is harder to recruit directors as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley,
just as there were reports, after the infamous decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), that companies were having trouble recruiting high quality directors. Edward Rock & Michael
Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L.
REv. 651, 659 (2002). Top executive positions, by contrast, apparently are not lacking for applicants.
181. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The provisions
bearing on corporate officers are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5241, 7243, 7262, and 7264 and at 18
U.S.C. § 1350.
182. The standard of care for directors when making business judgments is gross negligence. Van
Gorhom, 488 A.2d at 873.
183. Delaware corporations may include a provision in their certificates of incorporation absolving
directors from personal liability for money damages resulting from a breach of the duty of care. DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b) (7) (2001).
184. See generally Johnson, supra note 120. See infra notes 198-199.
185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
186. Stockholders may only exculpate directors, not officers. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7)
(2001). This critical distinction is occasionally ignored. See, e.g., Continuing Creditors' Comm. of Star
Telecomms. Inc. v. Edgecomb, No. Civ.A.03-278-KAJ, 2004 WL 2980736 (D. Del. Dec- 21, 2004), at
* 12 (wrongly stating that "the exculpation clause protects the Edgecomb Directors and Officers against
any claim for a breach of the duty of care.").
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2. Avoiding Judicial Encroachment into Business Decisions
The rationale that "judges are not business experts" 1ia 7 would seem to carry
equal-if not greater-weight for officers as for directors. Officers devote more
time to company business than do directors; 18 they possess greater information
and expertise about the business, and they are involved with far more of the
operational details of the business than are directors. Courts might more easily
imagine themselves in the position of directors-who devote relatively little time
to the business and act only episodically' 9-than in the shoes of senior executives
with a deep understanding of the ongoing inner workings and external challenges
of a large company 190
Moreover, as to the three deeper considerations underlying this rationale,19'
most seem applicable to officers. The risk of judicial hindsight bias still applies.
192
Furthermore, although officers who make faulty decisions may not face ouster
from stockholders, they do face the risk of removal from office by directors, 193 a
risk that in recent years has greatly escalated. They-and the companies they
work for-also confront the punishing competitive pressures of product, labor,
and capital markets. 194 Finally, awareness of their own cognitive limitations and
informational disadvantage may lead judges to adopt-as a decision making strat-
egy-a policy of deference to corporate decision makers. 
19
5
The key question on this last point, however, is to which decision maker should
the court defer? If the board of directors and the senior officer, whose decision is
challenged, by, say, a stockholder, agree that the company should not pursue the
claim of wrongdoing, the court may equivocate and simply say it defers to "man-
agement" in dismissing the claim. Or, the court may say it is deferring to the
judgment of the board, because the board supports dismissal. Where, however,
it is the board itself that is pursuing a claim of wrongdoing against an officer, the
court must squarely decide whether it will defer to the judgment of the board in
187. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating "judges are not business
experts").
188. In 2002, directors of public corporations devoted an annual average of 190 hours to director
duties- Judith Bums, Everything You Wanted to Know About Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J., Oct.
27, 2003, at R6-R7.
189. Id.
190. Professor Bainbridge, building on former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Veasey's ob-
servation that courts are very reluctant to interfere with decisions involving "enterprise" issues, believes
courts should more readily defer to "operational" decisions than to judgments involving structural
matters. Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 129. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate
Governance in America, 52 Bus. LAw. 393, 394 (1997). This would seem to mean, overall, greater
deference to officer-level rather than director-level decisions.
191. See supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 156-161.
193. Officers may be removed from office at any time, with or without cause, by the board of
directors. 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.43(b) (2000-02).
194. One court specifically cited this rationale for according business judgment rule protection to
a corporate officer. Rosenfeld v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994). See supra
note 159.
195. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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advancing the claim or to the judgment of the officer seeking its dismissal.196
Consideration of this factor takes us into the heart of the all-critical third rationale,
however, which will be fully addressed later.
Overall, when the various considerations underlying the second rationale are
examined, a strong case can be made that the rationale supports judicial deference
to officer decisions. Perhaps, given officer responsibility for complex operational
issues having a less discrete character than board decisions, courts may be highly
uncertain of their competence to evaluate officer conduct and, hence, may be
even more deferential than they are to director level decisions. 197 Again, however,
as with the first rationale, we must differentiate deference to the substantive
soundness of the judgment itself from rightful insistence that officers fully dis-
charge their duty of ordinary care in preparing for, making, and carrying out the
business decision. The business judgment rule rightly precludes inquiry into the
former;, "' the officer's duty of due care demands inquiry into the latter. 199
3. Preserving the Board's Governance Role
The rationale that directors-not judges-possess statutory authority to over-
see corporate affairs does not support applying the business judgment rule to
officers. It does, however, support deference to director decisions about pursuing
(or not pursuing) fiduciary duty claims against officers. The Delaware Supreme
Court has expressly linked director control over corporate litigation to the stat-
196. Where the court defers to the business judgment of the board in pressing the claim, the board
must still prove its underlying claim that the officer breached a fiduciary duty The procedural effect
of not granting an officer the broad protection of the rule is that a board seeking to press a claim
would not face the high burden of overcoming a pretrial motion to dismiss grounded solely on the
strong presumption of propriety the rule accords-
197. See supra note 190. On the other hand, the Enron Bankruptcy Examiner concluded that "the
roles and responsibilities of officers present a different context in which to apply ... [standards of
conduct] and may subject officer conduct to a higher degree of scrutiny than that given to director
conduct." In re Enron Corp., Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Third Interim Report of
Neil Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. B, at 8 (June 30, 2003).
198. Judge Winter's precise phrasing of what the business judgment rule does frequently is over-
looked: "[Lliability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and
this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labelled
[sic] the business judgment rule." Joy v. North, 692 E2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
Judge Winter rightly limited the rule to protecting only against liability for judgments that were
unsuccessful. He did not excuse directors or officers from exercising due care. See infra note 199.
199. The Delaware Supreme Court made it very clear in 1984 that the protection of the business
judgment rule-precluding inquiry into the soundness of a business judgment-was dependent on
directors discharging their duty of care: "[T]o invoke the rule's protection directors have a duty to
inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available
to them. Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their
duties." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1994). The comment to RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 379 (1958) also makes clear that an agent exercising discretion to make a judgment
must act with care and competence: "In the use of this discretion [the agent] is under a duty to act
competently and carefully and for a mistake in judgment resulting from a failure to have the standard
knowledge or to use the standard care, [the agent] is subject to liability to the principal." Id. § 379
cmt. C.
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utory grant of authority: "Directors of Delaware corporations derive their mana-
gerial decision making power ... to initiate, or refrain from entering, litigation,
from 8 Del. C. § 141(a)." 200 This places the locus of authority over litigation with
directors, not officers. This means that directors, upon learning of fiduciary
wrongdoing by a corporate officer, must investigate and decide whether to pursue
a claim by means of litigation, or to resolve it through imposing an intra-firm
sanction or by reaching a negotiated settlement. In making that decision, only
independent, disinterested directors can act on the matter and they must dis-
charge their own fiduciary duty to act with due care and in good faith. 20 1 Here
too, incidentally, we see that just as the business judgment rule is not applied in
reviewing conduct by self-interested directors, officers-with their deeper, more
lucrative company connections-are more likely than directors to fall outside
coverage of the rule anyway, due to their financial self-interestedness in the de-
cisions they make.
If directors make a considered business judgment to pursue a breach of fidu-
ciary duty claim against an officer, the rationale of honoring director discretion
means that officer conduct should not be deferred to under the auspices of the
business judgment rule but, instead, should be scrutinized in accordance with
the underlying standard of ordinary care applicable to officers. In this setting, the
board has made a considered judgment that it is in the corporation's best interests
to pursue a claim that the officer breached his or her duty to the corporation. As
representative of the corporation's interests, the board's judgment to pursue the
claim should be judicially respected. For a court to broadly shelter a corporate
officer's conduct from judicial review under the applicable standard of care by
using the business judgment rule to deflect an assessment of officer misconduct
serves to undermine the board's decision to hold its agent to the relevant standard
and violates the third rationale underlying the business judgment rule.202 This is
precisely the grievous mistake made in the Hangen decision.20 3 That case involved
an action brought in the corporation's name by its sole stockholder and director
against a manager. After rightly acknowledging that, as an agent, the manager
owed a duty of ordinary care, 20 4 the court did not condition application of the
rule on discharging the duty of care. 20 5 Rather, the court wrongly applied the
business judgment rule to avoid holding the manager to the applicable care stan-
dard.20 6 This confuses the function of these two notions-it is not the purpose of
the business judgment rule to excuse an officer from the duty to exercise due
200. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (citations omitted).
201. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (noting that
only disinterested directors acting with due care receive protection of the business judgment rule).
202. If the business judgment rule only precluded inquiry into the substantive soundness of an
officer's decision-as this author has argued should be the case, for directors as well, see Johnson,
supra note 120-rather than serving, as it does in Delaware for directors, to lower the standard of
care, this would not be such a problem.
203. Para-Med. Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P2d 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
204. Id. at 722.
205. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
206. Hangen, 739 P2d at 722.
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care; its true function is to prohibit retrospectively using a judgment's poor out-
come to conclude that due care was not exercised. The court, however, by in-
appropriately deferring to the manager's carelessly-entered business decision, re-
fused to give proper deference to the director's judgment to attempt to hold the
manager accountable for breaching his fiduciary duty of care. 20 7 This violates,
rather than honors, the third rationale for the rule; namely, that directors (not
courts or officers) oversee corporate affairs, including litigation against wrongdoers.
Yet, the Hangen decision is cited approvingly by courts and commentators.20 8
If directors elect not to bring an action against a wrongdoer, stockholders, of
course, may seek to initiate a derivation action. This will bring the matter within
the rules governing derivative litigation, 20 9 which essentially pit the views of stock-
holders-who wish to pursue the claim of officer wrongdoing-against the views
of directors-who, in this setting, wish not to initiate or to dismiss the claim.
210
Assuming disinterested, independent directors fulfill their own fiduciary duties
to act with due care and in good faith, their decision not to pursue the claim
should judicially be respected by the court, under the third rationale, as a proper
exercise of director business judgment.
21
1
Refusing to apply the business judgment rule to officers in a way that too
broadly shields officers from their obligation to act with due care and loyalty does
not mean directors will routinely use litigation to pursue remedies for officer
breaches of duty In fact, such litigation may remain relatively scarce. It does,
however, accord directors considerable leverage in their dealings with officers,
leverage that may go beyond the bargained-for terms of an employment agree-
ment. Although tightly written employment contracts can make it very difficult to
terminate senior officers "for cause,"212 breaches of fiduciary duty, unless contracted
around, create liability independently of contract.213 Therefore, improper behavior
not permitting termination "for cause," may, nonetheless, constitute a fiduciary duty
breach according the corporate principal various noncontractual remedies. These,
207. See id.
208. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 6, at 235; supra note 97 and accompanying text.
209. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004) (distinguishing
derivative from direct claims). In a derivative claim, generally stockholders must first make demand
on directors. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993) (utilizing the test for demand
futility where board made no business judgment); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
(utilizing the test for demand futility where the board made a business judgment).
210. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying motions
to dismiss derivative action against directors and former president).
211. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257 (Del. 2000).
212. Joann S. Lublin, Windfalls Are Common in Ousters Over Alleged Ethics Violations, WALL ST. J.,
Nov: 25, 2003, at B8. Professors Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas found that the most common
grounds for "just cause" termination of a CEO, based on their review of 375 employment agreements,
were moral turpitude (72.27%), willful misconduct (69.07%), failure to perform duties (57.87%),
and fiduciary breach (50.67%). STEWART J. SCHWAB & RANDALL S. THOMAS, WHAT Do CEO's BARGAIN
FOR?: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY oF KEY LEGAL COMPONENTS OF CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 25 (Van-
derbilt University Law School Law & Economics Working Paper No. 04-12, Apr. 2004).
213. See, e.g., GAB Bus. Serv., Inc., v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Serv., Inc., No. G021350, 2000
Cal. App. LEXIS 687 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2000); see generally DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCs: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 122-23, 125-26 (Aspen Law & Business
2002).
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in turn, may alter the balance of power in favor of the board in fashioning an
appropriate intra-firm sanction or advantageous severance arrangement.
2 14
B. ASSESSMENT
Although the second rationale underlying the business judgment rule might
warrant extending the rule to officers, the first and third rationales do not. Perhaps
other factors uniquely supporting application of the rule to officers exist, but they
have not been identified. A strong policy case for applying the rule to officers
therefore has not yet been made. What about the matter of stockholder prefer-
ences on this topic? Courts and commentators are quick to speculate as to investor
preferences for a high threshold for imposing director liability Professor Bain-
bridge regards the business judgment rule as a default rule stockholders prefer,
but focuses on what they desire in relation to directors, 15 not officers.
Existing legal arrangements might more or less reflect stockholder preferences
(or less strongly, reflect what stockholders will minimally tolerate). If this is true
of liability rules bearing on directors, it is likewise true for officer liability rules.
Therefore, we can infer that stockholders prefer (or tolerate) existing default rules
for corporate officers. These rules are clear, if often wrongly described.
Currently, the standard of care applicable to officers is that of ordinary care or
negligence. 216 Currently too, we have seen that there is very little solid case law
authority in favor of granting generous business judgment rule protection to of-
ficers, 21 7 and no compelling policy basis for doing so. Consequently, although
perhaps not acted on in a way that has produced much authoritative case law,
the better view as to the current default rule for officer liability is that the business
judgment rule does not apply to officers in the same broad fashion it has been
applied by Delaware courts to protect directors. Of course, we do not really know
(as opposed to just imagining) whether stockholders prefer this legal state of
affairs, though it is hard to believe most investors wish to hold officers to a
standard of care below what they expect from all other people (except directors)
who act on their behalf, such as doctors, lawyers, stock brokers, automobile
drivers, etc. Moreover, if they disfavor the current liability rule as too strong, they
can seek to "contract around" the rule. They can do this in at least two ways.
First, directors, as representatives of the stockholders, can, ex ante, enter em-
ployment agreements with officers modifying their fiduciary duty of care to a
weaker standard, say, to a gross negligence standard or, though less likely, elimi-
214. Lublin, supra note 212 (describing the backlash against paying severance compensation to
departing executives who engaged in wrongdoing). Although Professors Schwab and Thomas found
that only about half of their sample employment contracts allowed a "just cause" termination for
breach of fiduciary duty, supra note 212, failure to perform duties would still subject the CEO to
various common law remedies, whether or not it constituted "cause" for termination. Moreover, al-
though Professors Schwab and Randall found that "poor performance" was not included as cause for
termination in most CEO contracts, supra note 212, such conduct would likely constitute breach of
an agent's fiduciary duty of ordinary care.
215. Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 83 n.22.
216. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part II.
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nating the duty altogether.218 Alternatively, directors could leave the duty intact
but agree to eliminate (or place a cap on) the money damages that could be
recovered from an officer for breaching the duty of care, similar to what stock-
holders may do for directors in a company's certificate of incorporation.
219 If
directors will not do this on their own initiative, stockholders may request that
they do so or, under SEC proxy rules,2 20 submit a stockholder proposal for action
(even if nonbinding) at the annual meeting. The fact that there is no great clam-
oring for any of these actions might suggest that stockholders believe the current
liability regime is working well. One problem with this position, however, is that,
as this Article has shown, most legal authorities state that officers face only the
same liability risks as directors, when, in fact, a correct understanding of existing
legal authority reveals they actually face (and should face) greater risk. This sug-
gests that, because other nonlegal but socially powerful mechanisms seem to be
impeding corporate lawsuits against officers-such as settlements or director re-
luctance (for whatever reason, perhaps the same reason they overpay officers)
even to initiate action-stockholders may prefer the current arrangement along
with the more lax liability scheme that the law is wrongly said to adopt, rather
than the stricter positive law regime that, on the books at least, actually prevails.
Whatever is the case, however, the point remains that if stockholders want to
alter what they understand to be the current arrangement, they can communicate
that desire to directors.
Second, states wishing to give stockholders better voice on this issue could
follow the lead of Virginia and allow stockholders, through a provision in the
articles of incorporation, to eliminate, or place a cap on, officer liability for wrong-
doing as well as director liability for wrongdoing.22' Absent express stockholder
218. For an expression of concern about allowing one fiduciary-the board of directors-to freely
exculpate another group of fiduciaries-senior officers-see Johnson & Millon, supra note 10.
219. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (permitting stockholders to exculpate directors
from liability for money damages for breaching duty of care). It is surprising to this author that more
lawyers for executives do not seek to negotiate fiduciary duty issues in the employment agreement,
for the purpose of lowering the standard of care or reducing the liability exposure, or both. Instead,
they focus on the termination provisions, ignoring the fact that fiduciary duty claims arise indepen-
dently of contract, but can be, within limits, contractually modified.
220. SEC Rule 14a-8 permits stockholders to submit proposals for inclusion in the board's proxy
materials sent to all stockholders- 17 C.FR. § 240.14a-8 (2004).
221. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1999).
Limitation on liability of officers and directors; exception.-
A. In any proceeding brought by or in the right of a corporation or brought by or on behalf
of shareholders of the corporation, the damages assessed against an officer or director arising out
of a single transaction, occurrence or course of conduct shall not exceed the lesser of:
1. The monetary amount, including the elimination of liability, specified in the articles of
incorporation or, if approved by the shareholders, in the bylaws as a limitation on or elimination
of the liability of the officer or director; or
2. The greater of (i) $100,000 or (ii) the amount of cash compensation received by the
officer or director from the corporation during the twelve months immediately preceding the act
or omission for which liability was imposed.
B. The liability of an officer or director shall not be limited as provided in this section if the
officer or director engaged in willful misconduct or a knowing violation of the criminal law or
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action, Virginia's statute sets officer and director liability at the greater of $100,000
or the amount of cash compensation received by the wrongdoer during the twelve
months preceding the wrongful act or omission. 222 The ALI, moreover, allows
stockholders to limit, but not eliminate, officer liability for wrongdoing to the
amount of an officer's annual compensation. 223 Losing a year's pay that one
thought had already been earned, can be a potent reminder that officers owe
fiduciary duties.224 At the same time, a limitation on damages spares officers the
draconian exposure to monetary claims that could induce a decision maker to be,
if only at the margin, overly risk adverse.
225
Another buffer against excessive exposure to personal liability for officers is the
fact that any recovery is likely to come from the Directors' and Officers' ("D&O")
liability insurance policy purchased by the corporation. 26 Thus, the corporation,
upon the board (or shareholders, in some instances) making a decision to pursue
such a claim, would sue the officer for breach of duty, and the officer would be
covered under a "Side A" (or nonindemnifiable loss) insurance policy purchased
with corporate funds specifically for director and officer (not corporate) protec-
tion. Perhaps the existence of third party coverage somewhat undercuts the
healthy deterrent effect of liability On the other hand, it does provide a source
for recovery by the corporation and may be a sensible way for the corporation to
induce in officers a desirable propensity to engage ir riskier conduct by reducing
the risk element in the risk/reward assessment. 227 If the latter occurs, this weakens
the force of the argument-already weak, in this author's view-that officers, like
directors, will not serve or act appropriately if they face the risk of severe liability
Perhaps a middle ground is to find a way for officers to continue to face some
liability-perhaps for retained coverage (the deductible) on the policy-payment
of which might be high enough to sting but not so high as to deter desired
conduct. Currently, however, it appears that most "Side A" policies have no de-
ductible, but provide coverage from the first dollar of exposure.
of any federal or state securities law, including, without limitation, any claim of unlawful insider
trading or manipulation of the market for any security
C. No limitation on or elimination of liability adopted pursuant to this section may be affected
by any amendment of the articles of incorporation or bylaws with respect to any act or omission
occurring before such amendment.
Id.
222. Id. Officers, who make more money than directors, obviously face greater liability than di-
rectors under this provision.
223. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.19 (permitting limitation on officer liability, under
certain circumstances, to annual compensation).
224. Alfred F Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L. J.
895, 914 (1972).
225. As noted earlier, however, this author does not believe this factor looms as large in officer
thinking as it may for directors. See supra notes 167-181 and accompanying text.
226. Conard, supra note 224, at 901.
227. Professor Larry Hamermesh made the point to the author that one reason directors may not
sue officers is that doing so might reduce the amount of liability coverage available for directors,
should they also be sued (or anticipate being sued) for breaching their fiduciary duties in not con-
ducting themselves properly in relation to the officers.
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A final hurdle to recovery of damages against an officer is the element of cau-
sation. Any breach of fiduciary duty claim against an officer-whether or not
damages have been capped by contract or by statute-requires that the plaintiff
establish that the wrongdoing is the cause of damage to the corporation.2 28 In the
complex world of commerce, where many factors may intervene to alter a cor-
poration's financial well being, proving that officer negligence caused damage can
be a daunting obstacle to overcome.
V. CONCLUSION
Case law support for extending broad business judgment rule protection to
officers is far weaker than commentators and courts acknowledge or appreciate.
The policy case, likewise, fails to stand up, at least based on the standard rationales
underlying the rule's application to directors. This means that corporate officers-
like other agents-face potential liability for damages caused by breaching the
duty of ordinary care they owe the corporation. The decision to pursue or relin-
quish the corporation's claim generally belongs to the directors, whose decision
to pursue the claim should be accorded deference by the courts.
Liability rules certainly are not the only-or maybe even the most important-
factor shaping the behavior of corporate officers.2 2 9 Professional, reputational,
moral, and cultural considerations, along with well designed incentives and well
functioning market constraints, can play key roles in leading most officers to
desire to perform well. Nonetheless, just as criminal and administrative law sanc-
tions increasingly are used to punish and deter corporate officers in this era of
corporate scandal, 230 so too the prospect of civil liability for breaching fiduciary*
duties can serve a useful purpose.2 3' Too often, corporate officers and their ad-
visors may believe that employment agreements establish the outer limits of ex-
ecutive legal responsibilities. Just as criminal law sanctions today are reminding
many officers that society at large expects certain minimal behavior from them,
the prospect of exposure to civil liability can remind officers that stockholders
and directors likewise expect adherence to basic fiduciary standards, without un-
deserved refuge in the business judgment rule.
228. Cohn, supra note 130, at 629-30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399 (1958).
229. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 275-76 (1986).
230. See supra note 2.
231. See William L. Cary & Sam Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present Day
Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61, 64-66 (1972) (advocating higher standard of care for
officers).
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